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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMN #0048 0321345  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
R 011345Z FEB 08  
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7909

UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 000048

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DSS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/WHA, DS/EX/PPB,  
DS/OSAC, FSI/LMS/CMT FOR RUTH ABRAMSON

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [KCRM](#) [UY](#)

SUBJECT: ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) -  
SPRING 2008

REF: STATE 07551

11. Annual Crime Evaluation Questionnaire - the following  
responses are keyed to REFTEL 07551.

2.Crime Mobility (into Emboff neighborhoods):

1A. Criminal elements roam freely day or night and target  
Emboff and affluent residential areas for burglary.

13. Crime Ambiance (around Emboff neighborhoods):

1A. Within walking distance (approximately one mile), in  
which bands of criminals freely operate and where street and  
residential crimes frequently result in violence to residents.

13. Aggressiveness of Criminals:

1A. Commit street crimes and burglaries but rely on stealth  
during burglaries.

15. Arming of Criminals  
Criminal perpetrators usually are:

1A. Armed with knives or lethal cutting weapons.

16. Aggregation of Criminals  
Criminal perpetrators usually:

1A. Operate in groups of two to four individuals, are  
prepared to be confrontational, but generally avoid  
gratuitous violence.

17. Deterrence/Response of Police:

1A. Local police or neighborhood associations are totally  
ineffective in deterring or disrupting burglaries and other  
crimes in Emboff neighborhoods and seldom are able to  
apprehend or arrest suspects after the fact.

18. Training/Professionalism of Police:

1A. Police are mediocre in professionalism and training; they  
are somewhat apathetic toward post residential security  
requirements, including response to alarms and investigation  
of incidents in Emboff neighborhoods. They have definite  
resource/manpower limitations that inhibit their deterrence  
or response effectiveness.

19. Minimize considered.  
Baxter